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 The Press and the Expectation of Executive 
Counterspeech 
RonNell Andersen Jones* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Few catch phrases have burst onto the American political and journalistic 
scene with as much vigor as the term “fake news.”  President Donald Trump 
first used the expression in a tweet as president-elect,1 and it rapidly became 
his go-to response to a wide variety of news reports, ranging from allegations 
of his campaign’s ties to Russia,2 to assertions of sexual assault3 or discussions 
of the significant turnover in White House staffing.4  President Trump and his 
advisors have never specifically defined what they mean when they label a 
story from the press “fake news,”5 but it has now been invoked as a retort on 
 
* Lee E. Teitelbaum Endowed Chair & Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, 
University of Utah Law School and Affiliated Fellow, Yale Law School Information 
Society Project.  The author thanks Tyler Hubbard and Angela Shewan for their re-
search assistance and the participants of both the 2017 Free Speech Discussion Forum 
and the Price Sloan Symposium for Media, Ethics and Law presented by the University 
of Missouri School of Law and the Missouri School of Journalism at the National Press 
Club for their insights and feedback. 
 1. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 10, 2016, 9:11 AM 
EST), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/807588632877998081 (“Reports by 
@CNN that I will be working on The Apprentice during my Presidency, even part time, 
are ridiculous & untrue - FAKE NEWS!”). 
 2. Donald Trump’s News Conference: Full Transcript and Video, N.Y TIMES 
(Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/us/politics/trump-press-confer-
ence-transcript.html [hereinafter Trump’s News Conference] (responding to questions 
about the Russian dossier and meddling in the election, then stating that the reports and 
articles are “fake news”). 
 3. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 20, 2018, 10:16 AM 
EST), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/965968309358333952 (responding 
to allegations from the “Fake News Washington Post”). 
 4. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 7, 2017, 9:14 AM 
EST), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/839116941956640768 (“Don’t let the 
FAKE NEWS tell you that there is big infighting in the Trump Admin.”). 
 5. See Chris Cillizza, Donald Trump Just Claimed He Invented ‘Fake News’, 
CNN (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/08/politics/trump-huckabee-
fake/index.html (discussing Trump’s interview where he claimed he invented the term, 
but did not define it); see also Lucia Graves, How Trump Weaponized ‘Fake News’ for  
His Own Political Gain, PAC. STANDARD (Feb. 26, 2018), https://psmag.com/social-
justice/how-trump-weaponized-fake-news-for-his-own-political-ends (stating that dic-
tionaries and scholars struggle to define it); Katy Steinmetz, The Dictionary Is Adding 
an Entry for ‘Fake News’, TIME (Sept. 27, 2017), http://time.com/4959488/donald-
trump-fake-news-meaning/ (discussing disagreement over the definition of “fake 
news” amongst dictionaries). 
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hundreds of occasions—in interviews, at public appearances, and on social me-
dia.6 
The “fake news” retort is just one of a number of recent presidential re-
sponses to press coverage that have proven unsatisfying to critics because they 
are nonresponsive—that is, they lack clear, substantive content or verifiable 
facts that specifically counter the news story or otherwise clarify the truth.7  
Other nonresponsive retorts, including bare labeling of coverage as “bad”8 or 
 
 6. Angie Drobnic Holan, The Media’s Definition of Fake News vs. Donald 
Trump’s, POLITIFACT (Oct. 18, 2017, 2:11 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-me-
ter/article/2017/oct/18/deciding-whats-fake-medias-definition-fake-news-vs/ (stating 
that between January 2017 and November 2017, Trump had used the term “fake news” 
at least 153 times); Brian Stelter, Trump Averages a ‘Fake’ Insult Every Day. Really. 
We Counted., CNN (Jan. 17, 2018, 5:05 PM EST), 
http://money.cnn.com/2018/01/17/media/president-trump-fake-news-count/in-
dex.html (stating that between January 17, 2017, and January 20, 2018, Trump used the 
word “fake” 404 times in tweets or during public appearances).  Trump has used the 
term in various formats.  See, e.g., President Trump Ranted for 77 Minutes in Phoenix. 
Here’s What He Said, TIME (Aug. 23, 2017), http://time.com/4912055/donald-trump-
phoenix-arizona-transcript/ (using the term “fake news” twice and “fake media” once 
during the rally); Ian Schwartz, Full Lou Dobbs Interview: Trump Asks What Could be 
More Fake Than CBS, NBC, ABC and CNN?, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Oct. 25, 2017), 
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2017/10/25/full_lou_dobbs_inter-
view_trump_asks_what_could_be_more_fake_than_cbs_nbc_abc_and_cnn.html (ref-
erencing fake news seven times in the interview with Lou Dobbs that aired on October 
25, 2017); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 11, 2017, 9:55 AM 
EST), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/918112884630093825 (“With all of 
the Fake News coming out of NBC and the Networks, at what point is it appropriate to 
challenge their License [sic]? Bad for our country!”); Trump’s News Conference, supra 
note 2 (calling Jim Acosta of CNN “fake news”); see also Sarah Sanders (@PressSec), 
TWITTER (Jan. 13, 2018, 6:37 PM EST), https://twitter.com/PressSec/sta-
tus/952323750401331202 (posting an image with the title “Fake News: The Wall Street 
Journal.  Fake News Is at It Again!”). 
 7. Paul Waldman, Opinion, Donald Trump Is Executing a Brilliant Media Strat-
egy. If Only He Had a Strategy for Governing., WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2016/12/23/donald-trump-is-
executing-a-brilliant-media-strategy-if-only-he-had-a-strategy-for-govern-
ing/?utm_term=.da6ae143a52d (discussing the lack of news conferences and that “the 
media are starved for news” from this administration); see also Jason Schwartz, 
Trump’s Press Strategy: A Few Questions, Then a Quick Escape, POLITICO (Dec. 29, 
2017, 5:04 AM EST), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/29/trump-press-media-
strategy-319617 (describing Trump’s strategy to “[k]eep[] exchanges with the media 
short and avoid situations where he could be pinned down with in-depth questions and 
follow-ups.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 14, 2017, 
6:29 PM EST), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/897223558073602049 
(“Made additional remarks on Charlottesville and realized once again that the #Fake 
News Media will never be satisfied . . . truly bad people!”). 
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“wrong,”9 generic comments about what “people say,”10 vague threats that 
President Trump possesses contrary but unspecified evidence,11 or ad hominem 
attacks on individual journalists,12 share the same frustrating traits as the “fake 
news” rejoinder.  These responses assert what is not but contribute little con-
crete, additional information about what is. 
Commentators have noted—and complained about—the apparent trend,13 
but most of their criticisms have been focused on the ways that the “fake news” 
 
 9. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 6, 2018, 
7:55 AM EST), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/971006379375972354 
(“The new Fake News narrative is that there is CHAOS in the White House.  Wrong!  
People will always come & go, and I want strong dialogue before making a final deci-
sion.  I still have some people that I want to change (always seeking perfection).  There 
is no Chaos, only great Energy!”). 
 10. See, e.g., Rebecca Savransky, Trump on Chinese President: ‘Some People 
Might Call Him the King of China’, HILL (Oct. 26, 2017, 9:55 AM EST), 
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/357284-trump-on-chinese-president-
some-people-might-call-him-the-king-of (quoting a Trump interview with Lou Dobbs 
where the President said: “People say we have the best relationship of any president-
president, because he’s called president also”); Remarks by President Trump in Cabinet 
Meeting, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-state-
ments/remarks-president-trump-cabinet-meeting-6/ (discussing the amount of people 
impacted by DACA, Trump stated: “A lot of people say 800,000; some people said — 
yesterday, first time I heard 650 [thousand].  I also heard 3 million.  The fact is, our 
country was such a mess, nobody even knows what the numbers are.  But we’ll know 
what the numbers are.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 4, 2017, 
6:52 AM EST), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/837994257566863360 (“I’d 
bet a good lawyer could make a great case out of the fact that President Obama was 
tapping my phones in October, just prior to Election!”); Donald J. Trump (@real-
DonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 12, 2017, 8:26 AM EST), https://twitter.com/real-
donaldtrump/status/863007411132649473 (“James Comey better hope that there are no 
‘tapes’ of our conversations before he starts leaking to the press!”). 
 12. RonNell Andersen Jones & Lisa Grow Sun, Enemy Construction and the 
Press, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1301, 1318–20 (2017) (discussing the various targeted attacks 
on individual reporters, most notably his “vulgar attacks on the physical appearance, 
intelligence, and mental health of two news anchors . . . .”). 
 13. See, e.g., Marisa Kellam & Elizabeth A. Stein, Trump’s War on the News Me-
dia Is Serious. Just Look at Latin America, WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2017), 
https://wapo.st/2lijqCW?tid=ss_mail&utm_term=.2a7c8ba8e0c7; Trump’s War on 
Journalism, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/projects/la-ed-trumps-
war-on-journalism/ (“By branding reporters as liars, [Trump] apparently hopes to dis-
credit, disrupt or bully into silence anyone who challenges his version of reality.”). 
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mantra evidences an unquestioning political base14 or demonstrates an unfor-
tunate disrespect for the role of the press.15  In fact, however, much more is at 
stake when the president routinely offers nonresponsive retorts to press report-
ing.  The greater, but mostly unrecognized, harm is that these retorts are being 
offered as a substitute for counter-assertions by—and engagement with—the 
executive.  If a news report that is distributed to the public is erroneous, then 
democracy and First Amendment values are served by the president contrib-
uting more information with additional accuracy—not by the president shutting 
down dialogue with nonresponsive retorts or labeling the news coverage “fake” 
without revealing what the truth is.  On many topics, the President of the United 
States is better positioned than anyone in the world to counter misinformation 
and to clarify and correct errors.  A president’s unwillingness or inability to do 
so violates longstanding constitutional norms and upsets jurisprudential expec-
tations about the role of the press, the role of government, and the flow of in-
formation in a democracy. 
This Article explores the wider constitutional and democratic conse-
quences of a president’s refusal to engage in counterspeech on matters of public 
concern.  It argues that both fundamental principles of First Amendment theory 
and watershed cases from the United States Supreme Court presuppose a con-
stitutional system of dialogue between the press and the executive in which the 
president offers verifiable, supported, fact-based counterspeech to press cover-
age with which he disagrees.  Part II of this Article describes how marketplace-
of-ideas, self-governance, and checking-function principles—although more 
often invoked to protect private speech from governmental restriction—also 
manifest a longstanding assumption of executive counterspeech.  It explores 
the clear expectation within First Amendment jurisprudence that presidents 
will dialogue with, rather than shut down, the press when the press’s reporting 
on matters of public concern is erroneous, misleading, or otherwise faulty.  Part 
III of this Article describes the essential characteristics of this democracy-en-
hancing counterspeech and the ways in which nonresponsive retorts fall short 
of meeting the constitutional aims envisioned by the Court.  Part IV details the 
harms that follow from these failings.  I argue that, in addition to having the 
significant consequences of hampering government accountability and the 
public’s quest for truth, flouting the norm of executive counterspeech dimin-
ishes the wider tone of dialogue nationally and threatens the viability of the 
 
 14. See, e.g., Peter Apps, Commentary: Trump’s Early War with the Media Will 
Damage Both, REUTERS (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trump-me-
dia-commentary/commentary-trumps-early-war-with-the-media-will-damage-both-
idUSKBN1582HI (“If you can’t trust anyone[, including the media,] . . . then it be-
comes more difficult to question those in authority.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Paul Farhi, Press Advocates See Trump’s Words Behind Physical 
Attacks on Journalists, WASH. POST (May 25, 2017), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/lifestyle/style/press-advocates-see-trumps-words-behind-physical-at-
tacks-on-journalists/2017/05/25/f8ced468-4162-11e7-9869-
bac8b446820a_story.html?utm_term=.a3cca11d1999 (discussing the rise in disrespect 
of journalists and subsequent violent interactions). 
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larger marketplace of ideas.  The abandonment of this norm creates a grave 
threat to the democracy-enhancing role of accurate press coverage.  But it also 
disserves democratic and free-speech values when the press coverage is inac-
curate.  Indeed, despite the President’s apparent goal of disparaging the press, 
his failure to engage in executive counterspeech may leave the press itself in-
sufficiently checked by the executive. 
II. THE EXPECTATIONS OF EXECUTIVE COUNTERSPEECH IN A SYSTEM 
OF FREE SPEECH AND PRESS 
The theoretical and jurisprudential underpinnings of the American system 
of free speech and press understandably focus on the private speaker.  Because 
the First Amendment erects a barrier to governmental regulation of speech,16 
the justifications for our system of free speech center on private expression.  
Thus, when we consider the ways that free speech enhances our search for 
truth, our efforts for self-government, and our goal of governmental accounta-
bility, we ordinarily do so through the lens of the private speaker.  But this 
analytical scaffolding is not sustainable by mere individual freedom to speak.  
Scholarship exploring these themes, and United States Supreme Court juris-
prudence animated by these themes, evinces a wider expectation—indeed, a 
democratic imperative—that the executive will be a participant in meaningful 
conversations on matters of public concern and will respond with substantive 
counterspeech to erroneous assertions by the press on those issues. 
A. The Expectation of Executive Counterspeech in Major Free Speech 
Theories 
A set of oft-cited theories provide the foundation for a system of free 
speech and press in our democracy.17  Three of the primary theories justifying 
such a system—the marketplace-of-ideas theory, the Meiklejohnian self-gov-
ernance theory, and the checking-function18 theory—all share a largely unrec-
ognized central premise.  All three analytical approaches implicitly assume that 
government officials in a democracy will engage in dialogue with the public 
and the press.19  The values of finding knowledge and truth in a marketplace 
of ideas, of facilitating representative democracy, and of checking abuses of 
 
 16. Sorell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011) (“The First Amendment 
requires heightened scrutiny whenever the government creates ‘a regulation of speech 
. . . .” (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). 
 17. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47–51 
(1989); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 529–44 (1977), http://www.jstor.org/stable/827945 (tracing the 
foundation for free speech theory). 
 18. Blasi, supra note 17, at 554–65, 565 n.146. 
 19. See id. 
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governmental power are all advanced by meaningful executive counterspeech.  
All are crippled by its absence. 
1. The Marketplace of Ideas and Executive Counterspeech 
At the very heart of modern First Amendment jurisprudence is a free-
speech theory with a longstanding pedigree.  The belief that “the ultimate good 
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . 
.”20—is both “the theory of our Constitution”21 and the structure on which all 
our important national conversations are built.  The model is, at base, an ad-
versarial one: if truth and falsehood battle, truth will emerge the victor.22  In 
the process, the public benefits.  When the tested material proves false, correct 
information replaces incorrect information.  When the tested material proves 
true, believers gain a “clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, pro-
duced by its collision with error.”23 
The marketplace theory tells us not only why free discussion matters—
“for advancing knowledge and discovering truth”24—but also how participants 
in free discussion ideally behave.  “An individual who seeks knowledge and 
truth must hear all sides of the question, consider all alternatives, test his judg-
ment by exposing it to opposition, and make full use of different minds.”25  The 
theory thus envisions an active exchange, a vibrant give-and-take, and “partic-
ipation in decision making by all members of society”26 as they take “precau-
tions against their own fallibility”27 and offer additional information to others 
who are doing the same.  The envisioned contributions to the marketplace are 
not merely subjective ideas or opinions that the speaker hopes she may be able 
to persuade others to adopt, but also objective, factual information that the 
 
 20. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See John Milton, Areopagitica, in AREOPAGITICA AND OF EDUCATION 50 
(George H. Sabine ed., Harlan Davidson, Inc. 1951) (1644) (“Let [Truth] and Falsehood 
grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?”). 
 23. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 53 (Stefan Collini, ed., Cambridge Univer-
sity Press 1989) (1859); see also, THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE 
EXPRESSION 7 (1970) (“Discussion must be kept open no matter how certainly true and 
accepted opinion may seem to be; many of the most widely acknowledged truths have 
turned out to be erroneous.  Conversely, the same principle applies no matter how false 
or pernicious the new opinion appears to be; for the unaccepted opinion may be true or 
partially true and, even if wholly false, its presentation and open discussion compel a 
rethinking and retesting of the accepted opinion.”). 
 24. See EMERSON, supra note 23, at 7–8. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See MILL, supra note 23, at 22. 
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speaker possesses that would inform others.28  The theory thus anticipates that 
speakers who are invested in an outcome and know facts that would inform the 
discussion will provide them to the marketplace.  Such a system “is an essential 
mechanism for maintaining the balance between stability and change” because 
it “provides a framework in which the conflict necessary to the progress of 
society can take place without destroying the society.”29 
The United States Supreme Court has embraced this marketplace notion, 
expressing a jurisprudential confidence that “the path of safety lies in the op-
portunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and 
that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.”30  When speech in the 
public square is asserted to be offensive,31 dangerous,32 or false,33 the Court 
consistently responds that “the remedy to be applied is more speech . . . .”34  
The Court frequently reminds us that the Founders valued liberty not merely 
as an end, but as a means to the discovery and spread of truth.  We protect 
ourselves as a nation, the Court says, through discussion—with meaningful 
 
 28. See Blasi supra note 17, at 553 (“[S]omehow we have come to think of the 
passionate, often uninformed, soapbox orator as the class embodiment of our commit-
ment to diversity. . . . Yet a marketplace can trade in information as well as ideas, and 
in fact most of us probably seek new information more assiduously than we seek new 
points of view.”). 
 29. MILL, supra note 23, at 22. 
 30. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), 
overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 44 (1969). 
 31. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 
U.S. 397, 414 (1989)) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, 
it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because 
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Fal-
well, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (calling the speech at issue in the case “offensive,” “but 
the sort of expression involved in this case does not seem to us to be governed by any 
exception to the general First Amendment principles . . . .”). 
 32. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 374 (suggesting we protect speech unless it “would pro-
duce, or is intended to produce, a clear and imminent danger of some substantive evil 
which the state constitutionally may seek to prevent”); Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449 
(striking down an Ohio statute because it did not distinguish “from incitement to im-
minent lawless action”). 
 33. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344–46 (1974) (describing the high 
constitutional bar for libel against public officials and public figures, who have “signif-
icantly greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a 
more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals nor-
mally enjoy”). 
 34. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377. 
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contributions to the marketplace of ideas designed to counter, refute, and clar-
ify other contributions.35  Making those contributions, then, is “a political duty” 
and “a fundamental principle of the American government.”36 
Although the marketplace-of-ideas analogy is most often invoked against 
government regulation of the marketplace in ways that would hamper discourse 
among private speakers,37 the theory is plainly premised on the assumption that 
the executive also can, should, and will contribute to the marketplace of ideas.  
A quest for truth in the discussion of public matters is debilitated when infor-
mation held primarily or exclusively by the president is withheld from the mar-
ketplace.  The principle that false speech is remedied by more speech—and the 
concomitant principle that discussion offers clarification and improved under-
standing of even true speech—are no less true when the holder of the true in-
formation is a key government official.  Indeed, while the marketplace theory 
has faced thoughtful criticism from those questioning both the likelihood of 
fair access to the market38 and the likelihood that truth will emerge from it,39 
the theory’s core principles unquestionably support accurate executive coun-
terspeech as a critical aspect of the search for truth on matters of public con-
cern.  Withholding clarification or correction in the face of erroneous or mis-
leading news coverage violates the ideal and robs the market of its essential 
ingredients. 
 
 35. Id. at 375 (“Those who won our independence believed that the final end of 
the state was to make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its government the 
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.  They valued liberty both as an end 
and as a means.  They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be 
the secret of liberty.  They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as 
you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that 
without free speech and assembly[,] discussion would be futile; that with them, discus-
sion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doc-
trine . . . .”). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (quoting 
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503–04 (1984)) (“[T]he 
freedom to speak one’s mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty . . .  but also is 
essential to the common quest for truth . . . . We have therefore been particularly vigi-
lant to ensure that individual expressions of ideas remain free from governmentally 
imposed sanctions.”). 
 38. See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press – A New First Amendment Right, 
80 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1641, 1648 (1967) (arguing that “a self-operating marketplace 
of ideas . . . has long ceased to exist” and that “a right of expression is somewhat thin 
if it can be exercised only at the sufferance of the managers of mass communications”). 
 39. See Harry H. Wellington, Our Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 
1130 (1979) (“In the long run, true ideas do tend to drive out false ones.  The problem 
is that the short run may be very long . . . .”); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First 
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 974, 978 (1978) (calling “the 
hope that the marketplace leads to truth” an “implausible” notion given the ways the 
market is “biased in favor of presently dominant groups . . . .”). 
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss4/7
2018] EXECUTIVE COUNTERSPEECH 947 
The marketplace theory does not call for a marketplace of ideas com-
prised of purely private competitors, with no contribution of facts or opinions 
from elected officials.  Such a market would lack important information una-
vailable from any other source.  Instead, the theory envisions that speakers—
including the executive—will contribute ideas and demonstrate that those ideas 
can “survive and endure against hostile criticism.”40  Moreover, counterspeech 
by a government official “can be especially important to an equality-based con-
ception of free speech when its voice counters that of powerful, private speak-
ers.”41  In cases focused on core political speech, the Court has “emphasized 
the value of the government’s voice” in fulfilling this marketplace role.42  Ex-
ecutive counterspeech can insert new data and new perspectives into narratives 
previously controlled in one-sided ways by private speakers.43  Indeed, as First 
Amendment scholar Helen Norton has noted, private speech is often problem-
atically nontransparent and unaccountable to the public.44  Because even false 
political speech by private speakers can be constitutionally protected, execu-
tive counterspeech may be a crucial competitor to misleading or inaccurate 
speech in the marketplace of ideas.45  “[G]overnment will not inevitably speak 
in opposition to powerful, private interests; indeed it is often aligned with 
them,”46 but the marketplace theory suggests that the president’s contributions 
play a valuable part in the discussions.  “[T]he point is not that the govern-
ment’s views are necessarily correct, but instead that they may provide value 
by responding to speech from powerful, private parties that might otherwise 
not face effective rebuttal.”47 
 
 40. Harry Kalven, Jr., If This be Asymmetry, Make the Most of It!, CENTER MAG., 
May/June 1973, at 36 (“It is an insufficiently noticed aspect of the First Amendment 
that it contemplates the vigorous use of self-help by the opponents of given doctrines, 
ideas, and political positions. It is not the theory that all ideas and positions are entitled 
to flourish under freedom of discussion. It is rather then that they must survive and 
endure against hostile criticism.”).  Kalven’s article was written in response to an article 
by Antonin Scalia, arguing for the restoration of “adversary balance between the gov-
ernment and the press.”  Id. 
 41. Helen Norton, Campaign Speech Law with a Twist: When the Government is 
the Speaker, Not the Regulator, 61 EMORY L.J. 209, 249 (2011). 
 42. Id. at 224–25 (discussing as an example an opinion that “emphasized the value 
of the government’s voice in informing the voters on contested ballot measures – espe-
cially in countering powerful private speech . . . .”). 
 43. See, e.g., Helen Norton, The Government’s Manufacture of Doubt, 16 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 342, 342 (footnote omitted) (“This strategy was perhaps most fa-
mously employed by the tobacco industry in its longstanding campaign to contest the 
mounting medical evidence that linked cigarettes to serious health conditions.  At its 
best, the government’s speech can counter such efforts and protect the public interest, 
as exemplified by the Surgeon General’s groundbreaking 1964 report on the dangers of 
tobacco, a report that challenged the industry’s preferred narrative.”). 
 44. Norton, supra note 41, at 252. 
 45. Id. at 252–53. 
 46. Id. at 253. 
 47. Id. at 250. 
9
Jones: The Press and the Expectation of Executive Counterspeech
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
948 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
Scholars have rarely explored the ramifications of presidential refusal to 
contribute to the marketplace of ideas.  This is likely because the scholarship 
in the area has long been focused on the opposite concern—a concern about 
asymmetry of power and the ways that the government’s disproportionate re-
sources unfairly give its contributions greater weight.48  Recognizing those 
concerns, however, does not preclude a recognition of the possibility that the 
pendulum may swing in the other direction and the executive may refuse to 
contribute meaningful counterspeech.  The marketplace theory envisions that 
our system of competing ideas and information, with a back-and-forth of 
speech and counterspeech, is the best mechanism for advancing knowledge and 
finding truth.  The underlying norm that government leaders will contribute 
counterspeech is central to the theory’s structure and has proven critical to its 
practical operation in the real world of dialogue on matters of public concern. 
2. Self-Government and Executive Counterspeech 
The expectation that the executive will engage in counterspeech becomes 
even more apparent when the issue is considered through the lens of a second 
prominent theory animating our First Amendment landscape: the Mei-
klejohnian concept of free speech as a facilitator of democratic self-govern-
ance. 
Alexander Meikeljohn postulated that “[t]he First Amendment does not 
protect ‘a freedom to speak.’  It protects the freedom of those activities of 
thought and communication by which we ‘govern.’  It is concerned, not with a 
private right, but with a public power, a governmental responsibility.”49  
Meikeljohn’s concept of an ideal democratic structure for “[p]ublic discussions 
of public issues, together with the spreading of information and opinion bear-
ing on those issues,”50 envisions public conversations between and among vot-
ers, but also envisions dialogue between voters and their current and would-be 
 
 48. See, e.g., id. at 253 (noting the argument that “the government’s inherent 
power, prestige, and especially resources tilt the playing field such that dissenting 
speakers cannot fairly compete”); Frederick Schauer, Is Government Speech a Prob-
lem?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 373, 385 (1983) (reviewing MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN 
GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 
(1983)) (recognizing the potential for abuse in government speech but unwilling to 
agree that all abuse is a First Amendment problem); Steven Shiffrin, Government 
Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 592 (1980) (discussing government expenditures used 
to finance a campaign to pass a tax referendum); Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Government 
Speech and the Constitution: The Limits of Official Partisanship, 21 B.C. L. REV. 578, 
580 (1980) (“The government’s use of public resources to manufacture citizen support 
for a partisan viewpoint on political issues raises serious questions concerning the in-
tegrity of the democratic process.”). 
 49. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. 
REV. 245, 255 (1961). 
 50. Id. at 257. 
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representatives in government.  The United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized this driving force behind free speech protection, emphasizing that 
“speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence 
of self-government”51 and that “speech on ‘matters of public concern’ . . . is 
‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.’”52  Although arguments that 
speech freedoms ought to be strictly limited to these narrowly defined “public” 
issues or governmental matters53 have been rejected as overly restrictive,54 the 
Court has repeatedly recognized that dialogue about—and with—government 
officials “occupies the ‘highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment val-
ues[]’ and is entitled to special protection.”55  The theoretical justifications for 
a system of free speech in a democracy are at their strongest when the conver-
sations we are having are focused on public officials and their political delib-
erations.56  Propelling this high-value status is an appreciation for both the his-
torical origins of our First Amendment structure57 and the democratic impera-
tive for dialogue between the rulers and the ruled.  The Founders believed “that 
in [our] government[,] the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbi-
trary[;] . . . that without free speech and assembly, discussion would be futile; 
. . . that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a funda-
mental principle of the American government.”58  The entirety of American 
free speech doctrine is animated by an understanding that the people will speak 
to their government and that their government will speak back.59  The right to 
 
 51. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964). 
 52. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 
(1985) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)). 
 53. See Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
IND. L.J. 1, 27 (1971) (“[T]he protection of the [F]irst [A]mendment . . . must be cut 
off when it reaches the outer limits of political speech.”). 
 54. Id. at 34–35 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377–78 (1927) 
(Brandeis, J. concurring), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 44 
(1969)).  
 55. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (citing NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1983)). 
 56. See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 263 (1992) 
(“[T]he First Amendment is fundamentally aimed at protecting democratic self-gov-
ernment . . . .”). 
 57. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“[T]here is practically uni-
versal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free 
discussion of governmental affairs.”). 
 58. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled in part by Bran-
denburg v. Ohio, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
 59. See William V. Luneburg, Civic Republicanism, the First Amendment, and 
Executive Branch Policymaking, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 367, 370–71 (1991) (“[T]he Pres-
ident is one of the most important participants in the deliberative process mandated by 
the Constitution . . . [and] the constitutional process of deliberation must be more than 
a monologue; it must be a dialogue involving many interested ‘parties,’ including the 
public at large.”). 
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discuss policy ideas with other people would be an empty promise if not cou-
pled with the expectation of ongoing discussion about those ideas with the peo-
ple in power.60  Without some provision of information from the president to 
the people, the “important aspects of the freedom of speech and ‘of the press 
could be eviscerated.’”61  In analogous cases focused on the judiciary, the 
Court has found that citizens must have access to and active engagement with 
the work of that branch of government in order to “give meaning to those ex-
plicit [First Amendment] guarantees.”62  The citizens’ need to receive counter-
speech from the president is equally important to the First Amendment’s fuller 
promise of engaged, democratic dialogue. 
It is through the Meiklejohnian lens that we come to appreciate that free 
speech about the government must “carr[y] with it some freedom to listen”63 
to information from the government.  Hearing the president’s corrections or 
clarifications is essential to the public’s First Amendment dialogue.  Executive 
counterspeech presents the opportunity for the voter to hear the ways in which 
the president agrees or disagrees with her position and the factual premises on 
which the president intends to base his decisions, which advances Mei-
klejohnian goals of enhanced self-governance.  Self-governance goals dictate 
that “the First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-
expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of 
information from which members of the public may draw.”64  The norm of 
presidential counterspeech emerged from this understanding. 
Unless we are told what the president knows, why he has formed the 
views he has, and the factual information that he perceives as true, we cannot 
understand and accept the work he claims to do in our name.65  Indeed, Mei-
klejohn analogized all public discourse to a town meeting at which all view-
points must be presented, debated, and considered in order for participants to 
arrive at sound public policy.66  It is unspoken, but obvious, that government 
officials are present at the meeting—hosting it, substantively responding within 
it, and informing and improving the public policymaking emerging from it. 
Notably, an appreciation that free speech theory encompasses engage-
ment with and response by public officials is highlighted in one of the Court’s 
 
 60. See id. at 370 (“[T]he President’s power as resulting in significant part from 
his ability to persuade – in the sense of communicating with and perhaps thereby win-
ning over what otherwise would be administrative resistance to his policy initiatives – 
fits well with the notion of deliberative government as it was envisioned by the Fram-
ers.”). 
 61. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (citing 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)). 
 62. Id. at 575. 
 63. See id. at 576. 
 64. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978). 
 65. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 572 (“People in an open society 
do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept 
what they are prohibited from observing.”). 
 66. Meiklejohn, supra note 49, at 252, 260–61. 
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most recent discussions of speech in the public forum.  In Packingham v. North 
Carolina,67 the Court noted that a “fundamental principle of the First Amend-
ment is that all persons have access to places where they can speak and listen, 
and then, after reflection, speak and listen once more.”68  In suggesting that 
social media is the quintessential modern public forum,69 the Court explored 
not only the ways citizens speak to each other and to their elected officials 
using Facebook, Twitter, and other social media, but also the ways elected of-
ficials speak back.  Noting that “[g]overnors in all [fifty states] and almost all 
Members of Congress have set up accounts for this purpose,” the Court found 
that social media is not merely a mechanism for citizens to petition their elected 
representatives but that it is also a mechanism for citizens to “engage with 
them.”70 
All told, the core self-governance rationale holds that we need a system 
of free speech so that we can influence the executive’s decisions and “share in 
devising methods by which those decisions can be made wise and effective.”71  
Executive counterspeech is an integral component of that system. 
3. The Checking Function and Executive Counterspeech 
Executive counterspeech responding to press coverage is important in a 
democratic system of free speech not only because of what we know about the 
role of government, but also because of what we know about the role of the 
press.  The press’s work as a watchdog of government establishes an important 
trigger for expected counterspeech, and a third major theoretical justification 
for our system of free speech, championed by First Amendment scholar Vin-
cent Blasi, focuses on this “checking value.”72 
The construct, which emerged in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, 
is that freedom of speech and press have a critically important part to play in 
“checking the abuse of power by public officials” and “guarding against 
breaches of trust” by them.73  “[T]he basic assumption of our political system 
[is] that the press will often serve as an important restraint on government.”74  
The right of the press “to praise or criticize governmental agents and to clamor 
and contend for or against change” is a matter that “the Framers of our Consti-
tution thoughtfully and deliberately selected to improve our society and keep 
 
 67. 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017). 
 68. Id. at 1735. 
 69. Id. at 1734 (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U. S. 844, 868 (1997)) (“While in the 
past there may have been difficulty in identifying the most important places (in a spatial 
sense) for the exchange of views, today the answer is clear.  It is cyberspace – the ‘vast 
democratic forums of the Internet’ in general, . . . and social media in particular.”). 
 70. Id. at 1735 (emphasis added). 
 71. Meiklejohn, supra note 49, at 255. 
 72. See Blasi, supra note 17, at passim. 
 73. Id. at 527. 
 74. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 
585 (1983). 
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it free.”75  In performing this role, the free press “guards against the miscarriage 
of justice”76 and “has been a mighty catalyst in . . . exposing corruption among 
public officers and employees.”77 
In one sense, the checking-function theory of free speech differs radically 
from the marketplace-of-ideas and self-government theories in terms of its as-
sumptions about executive counterspeech.  The theory does not envision vol-
untary contributions of speech on certain matters by the president; indeed, its 
major assumption is that, on at least some issues, government officials will 
engage in secret wrongdoing and hide their misdeeds in ways that need to be 
exposed by private speakers—often members of the press.  Despite the assump-
tions of government fallibility and citizen distrust of government that lie at the 
heart of the theory,78 the theory also envisions that government officials will 
speak with substance to the people.  The checking function sheds light on the 
fundamental nature of executive counterspeech in our society because its es-
sential premise is that the private checking of government is part of a wider 
structural tension of speech and counterspeech—in  the form of press coverage 
and meaningful response to that coverage. 
That tension was the centerpiece of Justice Potter Stewart’s watershed 
article, “Or of the Press,” in which he asserted that a free press meant not 
merely “organized, expert scrutiny of government” and a “formidable check 
on official power,”79 but an active exchange between the press and government 
leaders, through speech and counterspeech, baked into a larger structural plan.  
Stewart argued that “the Founders deliberately created an internally competi-
tive system” between the press and the executive, just as they had done in de-
vising the three competing branches of government.80  Their “purpose was[] 
not to avoid friction,” but to combat autocracy “by means of the inevitable 
friction.”81  In this way, “the Free Press guarantee is, in essence, a structural 
provision of the Constitution”—one that only serves its higher public-serving 
goals if the other components of the structure, including thoughtful executive 
 
 75. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (“The Constitution specifically 
selected the press . . . to play an important role in the discussion of public affairs,” and 
that “[t]he press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses 
of power by governmental officials . . . .”). 
 76. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 560 (1966) (quoting Sheppard v. 
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966)). 
 77. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965). 
 78. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 86 
(1982) (“Freedom of speech is based in large part on a distrust of the ability of govern-
ment to make the necessary distinctions, a distrust of governmental determinations of 
truth and falsity, an appreciation of the fallibility of political leaders, and a somewhat 
deeper distrust of governmental power in a more general sense.”). 
 79. Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 705, 708 (1999). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
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counterspeech, are also observed.82  We “rely, as so often in our system we 
must, on the tug and pull of the political forces in American society.”83  Blasi’s 
theory anticipates executive counterspeech as a norm. 
The United States Supreme Court also maintains this presumption of ex-
ecutive counterspeech.  The Justices consistently assume speech and action on 
the part of the elected official in response to the checking-function speech and 
behavior by the press.  In key Court opinions, the press is not depicted merely 
as telling the public about officials’ misdeeds so that the public can decide what 
action to take.84  Rather, the Court says, “the press serves and was designed to 
serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials 
and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elected by the peo-
ple responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve.”85  The 
expectation is that the important “role of the media” is to “be a powerful and 
constructive force, contributing to remedial action in the conduct of public 
business.”86  More than this, the watchdog press is portrayed as serving an ed-
ucative function, with at least some of the information it conveys to the people 
coming in the form of material provided to it by government officials.87  In-
deed, a fundamental norm underlying press freedom is a notion that the press 
is a proxy for the citizen, engaging in the sort of substantive exchanges with 
the government that the citizen is entitled to have herself but lacks the time or 
resources to perform on her own.88  In all of these capacities, the press’s free-
dom is built on a concept of executive speech to and through the press and 
 
 82. Id. at 707, 710 (“The Constitution, in other words, establishes the contest, not 
its resolution.”). 
 83. Id. 
 84. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403. U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J., con-
curring) (“In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in other ar-
eas of our national life, the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power in 
the areas of national defense and international affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry 
– in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can here protect the values of 
democratic government.  For this reason, it is perhaps here that a press that is alert, 
aware, and free most vitally serves the basic purpose of the First Amendment.  For 
without an informed and free press there cannot be an enlightened people.”). 
 85. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966). 
 86. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8 (1978). 
 87. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’n of Revenue, 460 
U.S. 575, 585 (1983) (alternation in original) (quoting Grosjean v. Am. Press Corp., 
297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936)) (“[A]n untrammeled press is a vital source of public infor-
mation.”); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (quoting 
Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring)) (noting 
the press is central to “public understanding of the rule of law . . . .”). 
 88. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (“[I]n a society in which 
each individual has but limited time and resources with which to observe at first hand 
the operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon the press to bring to him 
in convenient form the facts of those operations.”).  See generally RonNell Andersen 
Jones, Press Speakers and the First Amendment Rights of Listeners, 90 U. COLO. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
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substantive responses to the concerns raised by the press on behalf of the pub-
lic. 
The Court’s jurisprudential approach to a free press further signals an ex-
pectation of executive counterspeech when it protects the press even in the face 
of error or irresponsibility.89  The Court openly concedes “that the press has, 
on occasion, grossly abused the freedom it is given by the Constitution.”90  
While “deplor[ing] such excesses,”91 the Court flatly refuses to “saddl[e] the 
press”92 with the “impossible burden of verifying facts with certainty.”93  It 
protects the press even when the press makes mistakes because of the expecta-
tion that government officials will counter any false information with clear, 
truthful additional information.  The idea is that the checking function will pro-
duce an ongoing pattern of revelations by the press followed by explanations, 
clarifications, or corrections by the president.  The Court is comfortable ac-
cepting “some degree of abuse”94 by the press because it believes the substan-
tive story will begin, but not end, with press coverage.  This premise centers 
on the norm of executive counterspeech. 
B. The Expectation of Executive Counterspeech in the United States 
Supreme Court’s Defamation Jurisprudence 
Most specifically, the expectation of executive counterspeech is an unde-
niable theme in the Court’s First Amendment approach to false and defamatory 
speech about public officials.95  In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,96 the most 
 
 89. RonNell Andersen Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks of the Press and 
Why It Matters, 66 ALA. L. REV. 253, 259–60 (2014)  (noting that the Court has histor-
ically protected the press “even when presented with strong counter-narratives—with 
press-freedom values pitted against ‘other values society ordinarily wishes to see pro-
tected quite vigorously, like the rights of criminal defendants, reputational rights, and 
rights of privacy’—or when confronted with evidence of press behavior gone awry or 
concerns about inaccuracy, sensationalism, or unfairness . . . .”). 
 90. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 51 (1971), abrogated by Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 91. Id. 
 92. RonNell Andersen Jones, The Dangers of Press Clause Dicta, 48 GA. L. REV. 
705, 712 (2014) (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967)); see also Shep-
pard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) (concluding that the constitution “require[s] 
that the press have a free hand” even when it engages in “sensationalism”). 
 93. Jones, supra note 92, at 712. 
 94. Hill, 385 U.S. at 388–89 (quoting 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 571 (1876)) (“Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use 
of every thing [sic], and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press.”). 
 95. See David Kohler, Self Help, the Media and the First Amendment, 35 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 1263, 1272–73 (2007) (“[C]ounter-speech as an integral part of First Amend-
ment theory has an unassailable pedigree, it has not often found its way in any explicit 
sense into actual constitutional doctrine.  The one clear exception to this is the consti-
tutionalization of defamation law.”). 
 96. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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classic of checking-function cases, an executive official sued the press over 
criticism of his official conduct, and the Court constitutionalized the law of 
libel, calling for a heightened showing of fault in such cases.97  An executive 
official may not prevail in a libel action unless he is able to prove actual mal-
ice—that is, that the press organization acted with knowing falsity or reckless 
disregard for the truth.98  While Sullivan and its progeny are almost always 
considered from the vantage point of the rights and protections of libel defend-
ants, this jurisprudence also unmistakably sets forth a presupposition regarding 
the public official, as the Court describes how it envisions false statements 
about government officials will be countered.  The cases in this area clearly 
anticipate an ongoing norm of executive counterspeech. 
The Court’s reasoning in Sullivan also has a deep Meiklejohnian thread, 
endorsing “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on 
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”99 and openly anal-
ogizing to the nation’s early rejection of seditious libel.100  The Court reminds 
us that because the form of self-government the Founders devised was “alto-
gether different from the British form, under which the Crown was sovereign 
and the people were subjects,”101 the Constitution embraced a new form of 
government-public dialogue. 
The structure of Sullivan shows the Court’s confidence that this robust, 
wide-open debate would sometimes—indeed, often—be in the form of dia-
logue that citizens would have with government officials themselves.  Thus, 
the Sullivan line of cases warns that those who seek public office must enter 
that fray prepared to be spoken about102 and prepared to speak back.  Officials 
should, the Court said, be treated as “men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy 
climate.”103  This is a judicial recognition not only that criticism would be the 
cost of doing business as an elected official, but also that “public officials . . . 
are made to bear the burden of ensuring that the public hears speech about 
public matters.”104 
The confidence that the criticized government official will not merely sit 
idly by as the press fulfills its checking function, but instead will actively en-
gage in First Amendment counterspeech, is woven throughout the Sullivan line 
 
 97. Id. at 291–92. 
 98. Id. at 279–80. 
 99. Id. at 270. 
 100. Id. at 273–74; see also Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (noting 
that N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan was “adjudicating in an area which lay close to seditious 
libel, and history dictated extreme caution in imposing liability.”). 
 101. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 274. 
 102. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) (describing the “com-
pelling normative consideration” that “[a]n individual who decides to seek governmen-
tal office must accept certain necessary consequences of that involvement in public 
affairs. He runs the risk of closer public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case.”). 
 103. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 273 (citing Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947)). 
 104. Tung Yin, Independent Appellate Review of Knowledge of Falsity in Defama-
tion and False Statements Cases, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 325, 371 (2010). 
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of cases.  Endorsing a broad marketplace-of-ideas rationale, the Court echoed 
Learned Hand’s maxim that the First Amendment “presupposes that right con-
clusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues . . . .”105  
The Sullivan Court spoke of the need for an “unfettered interchange of ideas 
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.”106  
It asserted that a “fundamental principle of our constitutional system” is the 
need to foster dialogue that spurs officials to “be responsive to the will of the 
people.”107  Indeed, the Court stressed that the Sullivan actual malice standard 
was both inspired by and modeled upon the privilege already enjoyed by gov-
ernment officials.108  Executive branch officials enjoy such a privilege because 
of our expectation of “fearless, vigorous, and effective” speech on their part, 
the Court said, and “[a]nalogous considerations support the privilege for the 
citizen-critic of government.”109  The Court, in other words, views vibrant 
speech and vibrant counterspeech as “fair equivalent[s],”110 and its First 
Amendment framework is constructed on a belief that the marketplace of ideas 
will receive both. 
The strongest signal of the Court’s constitutional expectation of executive 
counterspeech in the Sullivan line of cases is the focus on “channels of effective 
communication” in responding to falsehood.111  The Sullivan Court concluded 
that because “speech can rebut speech, propaganda will answer propaganda, 
 
 105. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (quoting United States v. Assoc. Press, 52 F. Supp. 
362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)). 
 106. Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). 
 107. Id. (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)); see also id. 
at 301 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting De Jonge v. Oregon, 
299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937)) (“[I]mperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitu-
tional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the op-
portunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to 
the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means.  
Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional govern-
ment.”). 
 108. Id. at 281–82 (italics added) (“In Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 [(1959)], 
. . . this Court held the utterance of a federal official to be absolutely privileged if made 
‘within the outer perimeter’ of his duties.”). 
 109. Id. at 282; see also id. at 304 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Barr, 360 
U.S. at 571) (“If the government official should be immune from libel actions so that 
his ardor to serve the public will not be dampened and ‘fearless, vigorous, and effective 
administration of policies of government’ not be inhibited, then the citizen and the press 
should likewise be immune from libel actions for their criticism of official conduct.”); 
Aaron Perzanowski, Comment, Relative Access to Corrective Speech: A New Test for 
Requiring Actual Malice, 94 CAL. L. REV. 833, 843 (2006) (footnotes omitted) (“[T]he 
Court demonstrated sensitivity to a plaintiff’s ability to speak in determining appropri-
ate liability standards.  The Court reasoned that because public officials enjoyed unlim-
ited immunity from defamation claims, the right of the public to criticize such officials 
must be similarly unrestrained.”). 
 110. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 282–83. 
 111. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974). 
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[and] free debate of ideas will result in the wisest governmental policies,”112 
the stricter actual malice standard was fair to impose upon public officials.  The 
marketplace of ideas will sort truth from falsehood when the topic is the be-
havior of a prominent executive branch official because that official, who “cer-
tainly has equal if not greater access than most private citizens to media of 
communication,”113 will offer the clarifications and corrections necessary to 
the endeavor. 
This theme, which animates every post-Sullivan case on libel standards, 
centers on the influence the public official has had—and the future influence 
he or she can be expected to have—on meaningful public conversations.  The 
president’s ability to contribute to the dialogue and “significantly to influence 
the resolution of those issues”114 is the chief characteristic that justifies more 
stringent restraints on his libel recovery.  In later cases, the Court extended this 
same reasoning to public figures who were not elected officials, but instead had 
achieved other prominence or fame.115  In applying the theme to public-figure 
plaintiffs,116 the Court offered an analogy to the public official’s capacity to 
engage in counterspeech as a primary justification.117  The “first remedy of any 
victim of defamation is self-help—using available opportunities to contradict 
 
 112. Curtis Publ’g. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967) (quoting Dennis v. 
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951)) (summarizing Sullivan). 
 113. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 305 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 114. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (“There is, first, a strong interest in 
debate on public issues, and second, a strong interest in debate about those persons who 
are in a position significantly to influence the resolution of those issues.”). 
 115. See, e.g., Curtis Publ’g. Co., 388 U.S. at 136, 140, 155 (holding that Butts, a 
university football coach, and Walker, who led a protest at a university, both had “po-
litical prominence” in the community, were public figures); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. 
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48, 49 (1988) (agreeing that Falwell, as a “nationally known min-
ister who has been active as a public commentator on politics and public affairs,” is a 
public figure). 
 116. Curtis Publ’g. Co., 388 U.S. at 154–55 (“[B]oth Butts and Walker com-
manded a substantial amount of independent public interest . . . and had sufficient ac-
cess to the means of counterargument to be able to expose through discussion the false-
hood and fallacies of the defamatory statements.”); see also id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., 
concurring) (emphasis added) (“And surely as a class these ‘public figures’ have as 
ready access as ‘public officials’ to mass media of communication, both to influence 
policy and to counter criticism of their views and activities.”). 
 117. See Ashley Messenger & Kevin Delaney, In the Future, Will We All be Lim-
ited-Purpose Public Figures?,  COMM. LAW., Mar. 2014, at 4, 4–6 (analyzing cases and 
arguing that a “realistic opportunity to counteract false statements” and “continuous 
access” to the communication channels” are key); Nat Stern, Unresolved Antitheses of 
the Limited Public Figure Doctrine, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1027, 1041 n.113 (1996) (noting 
that, since Gertz, court have routinely cited access to the media, or lack of access, as 
ground for classifying or refusing to classify the plaintiffs as public figures and citing 
cases to support the proposition); Perzanowski, supra note 109, at 836–37, 842–43 (ar-
guing that “the ability to respond to defamatory speech served as a central consideration 
in the creation of the public figure test” and that “access to self-help through corrective 
speech provides the primary justification for the current framework”). 
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the lie or correct the error”—and both public officials and public figures thus 
could be expected “to counteract false statements” and “influence the resolu-
tion of the issues involved.”118 
In cases finding that a series of plaintiffs fell short of public-figure status, 
the Court repeatedly hinged its determination on the absence of “the regular 
and continuing access to the media that is one of the accouterments of having 
become a public figure.”119  Libel plaintiffs who do not discuss matters with 
the press,120 make themselves central to a public conversation,121 or “engage[ 
] the attention of the public in an attempt to influence the resolution of the 
issues involved”122 are not similarly situated enough to public officials to be 
treated as constitutional equivalents.  Only those who “thrust themselves into 
the vortex of [a] public issue”123 and use their situation “as a fulcrum to create 
public discussion”124 are engaged in the sort of speech-and-counterspeech be-
havior that the Court envisions. 
Importantly, this jurisprudential focus on the corrective speech capacity 
of the executive is not just a discussion of remedy for harm, but rather an ex-
position of First Amendment values and of the wider counterspeech norms 
within those values.125  Counterspeech by the president is expected not because 
the Court is convinced that self-help will work,126 but instead because we are 
committed to more rather than fewer contributions to the marketplace of ideas 
when government leaders and their work are the topic at hand.  When the pres-
ident faces “unsubstantiated opinions or deliberate misstatements,” the Court 
has concluded as a structural, constitutional matter that “counterargument 
 
 118. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344, 345 (1974). 
 119. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 136 (1979). 
 120. See, e.g., Wolston v Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979) 
(“[P]etitioner never discussed this matter with the press . . . .”); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 
424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976) (“Nor did respondent freely choose to publicize issues . . . 
.”); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352 (noting the plaintiff did not “discuss[] either the criminal or 
civil litigation with the press and was never quoted as having done so”). 
 121. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 135 (“Hutchinson at no time assumed any role of pub-
lic prominence in the broad question . . . .”); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352 (noting that plaintiff 
“did not engage the public’s attention . . .”). 
 122. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 168. 
 123. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352; see also Wolston, 443 U.S. at 166 (“[T]he undisputed 
facts do not justify the conclusion of the District Court and Court of Appeals that peti-
tioner ‘voluntarily thrust’ or ‘injected’ himself into the forefront of the public contro-
versy . . . .”). 
 124. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 168. 
 125. See Perzanowski, supra note 109 at 841, 845 (suggesting “media access mili-
tates against the public figure’s interest in protection from defamation while simulta-
neously advancing independent First Amendment principles” and that “the democratic 
necessity of open discourse provided the primary thrust for developing such a bal-
ance”). 
 126. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 n.9 (“[A]n opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to 
undo harm of defamatory falsehood. Indeed, the law of defamation is rooted in our 
experience that the truth rarely catches up with a lie.”). 
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and education are the weapons available to expose these matters.”127  As one 
scholar noted, “the First Amendment does not guarantee effective remedies for 
defamation – it guarantees free speech and a free press,”128 and counterspeech 
is a vital component of those freedoms.  The interests at stake are not merely 
the interests of the would-be plaintiff, who is getting relief for a damaged rep-
utation, but the wider interests of third parties in the public, who are getting 
both sets of information.129  Counterspeech “does more than simply reduce the 
vulnerability of public figures to libel and slander: it furthers the values es-
poused by the First Amendment. Corrective speech contributes to robust public 
debate.”130 
Of course, we cannot force the president to engage.  There is no obvious 
constitutional mandate to respond to allegations, to offer corrections, or to pro-
vide substantive clarifications.131  But the jurisprudence plainly envisions these 
communications as the norm.  The whole of First Amendment theory and the 
core of the most important developments in modern media law are premised 
on the notion that the president will counterspeak rather than nonresponsively 
retort. 
III. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF EXECUTIVE COUNTERSPEECH 
The theoretical frameworks discussed above not only establish a consti-
tutional expectation of executive counterspeech, but also help to demarcate the 
line between what might fairly be classified as executive counterspeech and 
what is mere nonresponsive retort.  To contribute meaningfully to the market-
place of ideas, advance self-government, and enable the checking function, 
counterspeech would necessarily have a few essential characteristics. 
This Part explores those characteristics and contrasts them with the traits 
of some of the nonresponsive retorts commonly employed by President Trump.  
The issue of executive counterspeech is timely and urgent because there is rea-
son to believe that President Trump “is different in kind and not just in degree” 
from his modern predecessors in his hostility against and nonresponsiveness 
 
 127. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 304 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring) (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 389 (1962)). 
 128. Bruce J. Borrus, Comment, Defamation and the First Amendment: Protecting 
Speech on Public Issues, 56 WASH. L. REV. 75, 92 (1980). 
 129. See Yin, supra note 104, at 369 (“In a public official defamation case, we can 
visualize three distinct entities affected by the lawsuit: the plaintiff, the defendant, and 
the public.  The plaintiff’s interest is in vindicating her reputation from the defamation 
and obtaining compensation (and perhaps special damages) from the defendant.  The 
defendant’s interest stands in direct opposition to the plaintiff’s, which is to prove the 
truth of the defaming statement.  The public’s interest is in receiving information rele-
vant to the public official.”). 
 130. Perzanowski, supra note 109, at 845. 
 131. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) (“Neither the First 
Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to government 
information or sources of information within the government’s control.”). 
21
Jones: The Press and the Expectation of Executive Counterspeech
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
960 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
toward the press.132  But all presidents have engaged to one degree or another 
in evasion, spin, or other nonresponsive reactions to the press,133 and the prin-
ciples discussed below apply to all executives.  The modern, Trump-focused 
examples serve the wider function of exploring the quality and quantity of ex-
change between the press and the president that best serves democracy and 
comports with constitutional expectations. 
Given the marketplace, Meiklejohnian, and checking-function goals for 
dialogue on matters of public concern, the ideal executive counterspeech would 
be responsive, would be based on facts and evidence, and would meaningfully 
advance public conversations.  It would go beyond mere contradiction to offer 
counterargument—backed with reasoning and supporting evidence—and 
would provide clear, specific refutation, identifying a mistake and explaining 
to the reader why it is mistaken.134  Counterspeech to objectionable news re-
porting, in particular, would squarely address what was said in the report and 
meet it directly on its terms to offer a different perspective, more information 
on the specific topic, additional unreported facts, or clarification and explana-
tion of the facts reported. 
Although it would be ideal to the citizenry if the provided facts were true, 
the marketplace-of-ideas theory does not mandate this as a characteristic of 
useful counterspeech.  The theory assumes some falsehood will be contributed 
to the market, but at its most basic level, it at least requires that there actually 
be market contributions.135  Competing, verifiable facts can be sorted, chal-
lenged, investigated, and tested, and the theory assumes that citizens will do 
this testing and that from this competition of facts, truth will prevail.  But this 
sort of fact-challenging requires counterspeech that is on point and at least pur-
portedly fact-based. 
In contrast, executive reactions to objectionable press coverage are mere 
nonresponsive retorts when they lack these characteristics.  Bare labels—
“sad!” “wrong!” “lies!”—are too generic to meet the counterspeech criteria or 
to serve any of the Meiklejohnian, checking-function, or marketplace goals.  
Likewise, sweeping statements that purport to counter press coverage but are 
in fact sourceless generalities, like the assertion that “many people say”136 
 
 132. Id. at 1327–28. 
 133. See Jones & Sun, supra note 12, at 1328–31 (describing and comparing mod-
ern president-press tensions). 
 134. See How to Disagree, PAUL GRAHAM (Mar. 2008), http://www.paulgra-
ham.com/disagree.html (“[R]efuting the central point” is the most responsive and pow-
erful form of disagreement in the hierarchy of disagreements). 
 135. See Milton, supra note 22, at 50 (“Let [Truth] and Falsehood grapple; who 
ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?”). 
 136. See Jenna Johnson, ‘A Lot of People Are Saying…’; How Trump Spreads Con-
spiracies and Innuendoes, WASH. POST. (June 13, 2016), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/politics/a-lot-of-people-are-saying-how-trump-spreads-conspiracies-and-
innuendo/2016/06/13/b21e59de-317e-11e6-8ff7-
7b6c1998b7a0_story.html?utm_term=.ebd06f7d83ec (analyzing Trumps approach to 
assert controversial statements by utilizing third person attribution). 
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something is true, are not true executive counterspeech because they provide 
no verifiable, specific additional facts.  Plainly, ad hominem attacks on the au-
thors or publishers of press reports, such as engaging in simple name-calling 
or belittling the authority of the writer without addressing the substance of the 
press report,137 are not mechanisms for addressing the substance of an argu-
ment and thus are nonresponsive retorts rather than counterspeech. 
The assertion that a particular news report is “fake news,” without more, 
is a nonresponsive retort rather than constitutionally valuable executive coun-
terspeech.  This is true for a number of reasons.  First, “fake news” is nonre-
sponsive because it gives no additional factual information.  The phrase ad-
dresses no specific aspect of a given report, offers no clarification, and gives 
no useful new material to contrast with the material of the press report.  It con-
tains no reasoning or refutation.  It has none of the important features of de-
mocracy-serving, marketplace-of-ideas-enhancing, executive counterspeech. 
Additionally, “fake news” is a nonresponsive retort because the term itself 
has no clear meaning.  Given the wide variety of contexts in which it has been 
used, including its use as a reaction to press reports that very quickly proved 
factually accurate,138 the phrase as used by President Trump falls short of a 
clear, evidence-based denial.  It is ambiguous because the hearer does not know 
if she is being told that the particular news story is biased, that it is politically 
motivated, that it is factually erroneous in all of its facets, that it is factually 
erroneous in some of its details, or that it is merely something that President 
Trump wishes was not being covered.  Executive counterspeech of the sort 
envisioned by our longstanding constitutional theory would not leave a listener 
guessing about something so simple as the nature of thing being countered. 
Perhaps most significantly, the “fake news” response is not constitution-
ally valuable executive counterspeech because it is potentially deceptive ter-
minology.  This is because the words within the phrase have a pre-existing 
primary linguistic meaning, and the phrase—although apparently repurposed 
to mean something else—retains the residual effect of those more obvious con-
notations.  “Fake” is a word with a longstanding definition—false, inaccurate, 
fabricated, a hoax or fraud. In the run-up to President Trump’s election, the 
term “fake news” was used widely to refer to the rising problem of actually 
 
 137. See Jones & Sun, supra note 12, at 1310–11 (detailing “name calling and com-
petency-questioning” by Trump). 
 138. Margaret Sullivan, Trump Cries “Fake!” About Media Reports of White 




Eugene Kiely, Trump’s Phony ‘Fake News’ Claims, FACTCHECK.ORG (Jan. 16, 2018), 
https://www.factcheck.org/2018/01/trumps-phony-fake-news-claims/ (detailing occa-
sions when Trump has “labeled accurate news reporting as ‘fake news’”). 
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fabricated news stories, and some dictionaries embraced the term as referenc-
ing this phenomenon.139  At a time when there have been concerted efforts to 
disseminate actual fabrications on Facebook and elsewhere, and when the na-
tion already faces a crisis in media literacy and reader discernment,140 it is dam-
aging to self-governance and the marketplace of ideas to be further confusing 
information consumers with this coopted term. 
The least generous description of what is happening here is that President 
Trump is purposefully and falsely accusing legitimate, mainstream news or-
ganizations of being engaged in the deliberate wholesale fabrication of stories.  
Under this version of the events, in an effort to discredit all public discussion 
unfavorable to him,141 President Trump is deliberately undermining trust in 
those who are working according to high journalistic standards and producing 
carefully sourced stories about major public issues by wrongly accusing them 
of inaccuracies or fraudulent reporting.  This represents a severe threat to press 
freedom, a deliberate undercutting of a critically important civic institution, 
and an undermining of the free flow of information in a democracy.  It does 
not represent constitutionally valuable executive counterspeech. 
But even the most generous description of what is happening here 
amounts to a troubling lack of meaningful executive counterspeech.  Under this 
version of the events, President Trump and others in his administration are 
merely being hyperbolic when they use this nonresponsive retort against the 
press.  They could, for example, be using the phrase “fake news” to apply to 
something that might better be termed “fake newsworthiness.”  This would be 
a use of the term to indicate that President Trump takes issue, not with the facts 
as reported, but with the priorities, editorial discretion, perceived bias, or angle 
taken by the particular news outlet or story.  Through this lens, when President 
Trump retorts that something is “fake news,” he does not mean that the reporter 
wholly fabricated the story or that she literally did not have sources who told 
her the information that she reported; instead, he means that he wishes the 
sources had said something different, that he wishes that the sources had not 
talked to the press at all,142 that he thinks other sources might have countered 
 
 139. Lili Levi, Real “Fake News” and Fake “Fake News”, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. 
REV. 232, 233–235, 233 n.1 (2017). 
 140. See, e.g., Stanford Study Shows Most Students Vulnerable to Fake News, NPR 
(Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/11/22/503052574/stanford-study-finds-
most-students-vulnerable-to-fake-news (reporting that a study from Stanford Univer-
sity found “large portions of the students [surveyed] . . . had trouble judging the credi-
bility of the news they read”). 
 141. Leslie Stahl: Trump Admitted Mission to Discredit the Press, CBS NEWS, 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/lesley-stahl-donald-trump-said-attacking-press-to-
discredit-negative-stories/ (last updated May 23, 2018) (quoting Trump as saying, “I 
do it to discredit you all and demean you all so when you write negative stories about 
me, no one will believe you.”). 
 142. See, e.g., Rebecca Morin, Trump Says Leaks Exaggerated but Vows to Track 
Down ‘Traitors’, POLITICO (May 14, 2018), https://www.polit-
ico.com/story/2018/05/14/trump-leaks-traitors-white-house-586041. 
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that source, or that he wishes the news outlet would focus on other subjects 
more favorable to him.  That is, perhaps when President Trump says, “This is 
fake news,” he is saying, “This is not news” rather than “This is not true.” 
This explanation might place President Trump in a somewhat more fa-
vorable light, but it does not make this “fake news” retort appropriate executive 
counterspeech.  Having failed to specify what he means by the term, he leaves 
open the very real possibility that citizens will wrongly assume its meaning.  
When a president says, “This is not what I would call newsworthy,” but does 
so using a label that can also mean “This is not factually true,” there is a very 
real risk of deceiving listeners and mischaracterizing the work of journalists.  
The phrase cannot carry both meanings without imposing chaos in the market-
place of ideas and the realm of public affairs reporting.  Thus, under both sce-
narios, the “fake news” phrase represents an abandonment of the norm of ex-
ecutive counterspeech and the embrace of unhelpful nonresponsive retort. 
Two important practical realities seem to be animating the rise of nonre-
sponsive retorts and the declining norm of substantive executive counter-
speech.  Although a deep investigation is beyond the scope of this Article, both 
are worth noting for their important interrelationships with the problem ad-
dressed here.  The first is a changing communications and media landscape. 
The waning legacy media143 and the emerging ability of presidents to engage 
directly with the people through social media144 change the calculus on execu-
tive counterspeech.  While the velocity and volume of social media communi-
cations could conceivably support more and better counterspeech from the ex-
ecutive to the people in response to press coverage, some aspects of this new 
media technology seem to instead embolden nonresponsive retorts.  Character 
limits in some social media communications, for example, may push a presi-
dent to respond in less fulsome and more hyperbolic or reactionary ways than 
he might have in the past.  The directness of social media communications 
make it possible for a president to cut out the press as an intermediary and thus 
ignore the previous, longstanding norms of being interviewed by members of 
the press and responding substantively to their reports.145  Ironically, while 
Twitter and other social media tools have the capacity to be significantly more 
interactive than older forms of media, they also eliminate the direct journal-
istic-interview feature of legacy press coverage that so often made presidents 
feel obligated to offer substantive counterspeech.  Thus, in this new media era, 
the president engages less, rather than more, with the facts reported by others. 
 
 143. See generally RonNell Andersen Jones, Litigation, Legislation, and Democ-
racy in a Post-Newspaper America, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV 557 (2011) (detailing the 
decline of legacy media). 
 144. Jones & Sun, supra note 12, at 1342–43 (describing the shift to direct presi-
dential communication by Twitter). 
 145. Id. at 1343 (“[F]or the first time in press-President relations, the press has gone 
from being a necessary evil to merely being an evil,” and that because of social media, 
“[w]hat to say to the press, whether to engage with them, and even how to depict them 
to the wider public audience all become questions that can be answered unencumbered 
by the structural realities of the past”). 
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A second compounding factor in the uptick of nonresponsive retorts is the 
epistemological tribalism that increasingly pervades American politics and 
communications.  Voters are increasingly entrenched in their own echo cham-
bers, and this might suggest that those who support a particular president may 
no longer demand any counterspeech at all but instead be satisfied with—or 
even celebrate—nonresponsive retorts.  This phenomenon, sometimes referred 
to as “post-truthism,”146 in which “objective facts are less influential in shaping 
public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief,”147 has created a 
political culture in which either “truth matters less than it used to”148 or “some 
people ‘find’ truth through the use of post-truth reasoning: they discount em-
pirical data and rely instead upon emotional inputs, personal belief, deference 
to authority, and trust—even to determine truths that are empirically testable 
[.]”149  Research suggests that individuals are deeply influenced by their cog-
nitive biases and, in particular, that they select interpretations of data that con-
form with their political priors.150  Thus, nonresponsive retorts seem increas-
ingly acceptable to at least a portion of the population.  If one’s political base 
has no appetite for executive counterspeech and one’s political opposition has 
no mechanism for forcing it, it should be no surprise that nonresponsive retorts 
are the new go-to reply for a president facing objectionable press coverage. 
Whatever the complex set of factors causing the apparent shift from a 
background expectation of executive counterspeech to a field predominated by 
nonresponsive retorts, the counterspeech norm that undergirds both First 
Amendment theory and free speech jurisprudence is now routinely spurned. 
 
 146. See Sarah C. Haan, The Post-Truth First Amendment, 94 IND. L.J. (forthcom-
ing 2018) (“Essentially, post-truthism teaches that people should not use evidence-
based reasoning to make decisions, but should rely instead on emotion, intuition, and 
belief.”). 
 147. Word of the Year 2016 Is . . ., OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddic-
tionaries.com/word-of-the-year/word-of-the-year-2016 (last visited Oct. 3, 2018) (an-
nouncing “post-truth” as word of the year for 2016). 
 148. Haan, supra note 146. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., Motivated Numeracy and Enlightened Self-
Government, 1 BEHAV. PUB. POL’Y 54, 74 (2017) (“[W]hen policy-relevant facts be-
come identified as symbols of membership in and loyalty to affinity groups that figure 
in important ways in individuals’ lives, they will be motivated to engage empirical ev-
idence and other information in a manner that more reliably connects their beliefs to 
the positions the predominate in their particular groups than to the positions that are 
best supported by the evidence.”). 
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IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF ABANDONING EXECUTIVE 
COUNTERSPEECH 
Violating democratic norms comes with costs.151  A refusal to engage in 
executive counterspeech harms the nation, its people, and its press in specific 
and easily identifiable ways.  When a president replaces meaningful, substan-
tive counterspeech with nonresponsive retorts to press coverage, there are at 
least three sets of real-world consequences.  These might be labeled “Account-
ability Consequences,” “Marketplace-of-Ideas Consequences,” and “Press 
Consequences.”  Combined, these effects threaten to create an unprecedented 
impairment to our national conversations. 
A. Accountability Consequences 
The first set of harms of a president’s refusal to engage in executive coun-
terspeech centers on the self-governance and checking functions that counter-
speech would otherwise promote.  If executive counterspeech offers citizens 
the information they need to properly participate in their democracy, the with-
holding of it robs them of that opportunity.  Thus, a major harm of the failure 
to engage in executive counterspeech—and, perhaps, a major motivation for 
that failure—is the lack of presidential accountability that attends it.  When no 
counterspeech is offered, the citizen loses her ability to make decisions about 
actions taken and policies embraced by the president.  The voter is left without 
knowledge on which to base support or opposition to a given policy and with-
out information on which to make a decision at the ballot box.152  The citizen 
cannot know what the executive knows, what the executive believes, what the 
executive stands for, or what the executive has done if she is fed a steady diet 
of nonresponsive retorts.  Even the most participatory, earnest citizens cannot 
engage in the basics of self-governance if they are given only a set of press 
reports that the president demands not be believed, while he provides no coun-
ter-information about what they should instead know or understand.  Taken to 
its extreme, the abandonment of the norm of executive counterspeech leads to 
an utter failure of both governmental accountability and self-government itself. 
This reality illustrates that an abandonment of the norm of executive 
counterspeech is not merely an executive failing—although it certainly is that.  
It is also a public failing.  Elected officials cannot reasonably be expected to 
 
 151. See, e.g., RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West, Opinion, Don’t Expect 
the First Amendment to Protect the Media, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/opinion/dont-expect-the-first-amendment-to-
protect-the-media.html. 
 152. Of course, a citizen could determine that the lack of factual information pro-
vided by an incumbent was grounds for refusing to re-elect, and Americans may yet 
make that determination in response to the current administration.  But the more fun-
damental principle remains that nonresponsive retorts leave most citizens in the dark 
about many aspects of government decision-making. 
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hold themselves fully accountable, and their self-interests may often push 
against the public interest.153  Current trends strongly suggest not only that 
President Trump is ignoring the norm of engaging in counterspeech, but also 
that the public is ignoring the norm of demanding it.  The consequence is a 
dearth of the sort of informed, critical, and factual exchanges on which democ-
racy ordinarily rests. 
B. Marketplace-of-Ideas Consequences 
A second, related set of harms from a president’s refusal to engage in 
counterspeech focuses on the ways that this refusal impacts the marketplace of 
ideas.  Nonresponsive retorts—especially from speakers like the president, 
who is a unique keeper of information that is either held exclusively by him or 
best distributed broadly by him—disserve the search for truth. 
So, for example, if every time President Trump has responded with “fake 
news” he had instead responded with either “This is not true and here is the 
evidence” or “This is accurate but has been misinterpreted and here are the 
details to help you better understand,” the caliber of contribution to the mar-
ketplace would be exponentially higher.  Observers in the marketplace would 
have had real tools with which to decide the truth of the matter and counterfacts 
would have advanced the dialogue about the propriety of the decisions that had 
been made.  The “fake news” retort harms the marketplace whether the press 
report is false or true. If these counterfacts do not exist, President Trump is 
harming the marketplace with deceptive signals.  His cry of “fake news” is 
itself fake. If the counterfacts do exist, he is also harming the marketplace by 
withholding them and thereby robbing the marketplace of the competition be-
tween the challenged report and the new facts.  In nearly every instance, it is 
easy to see how counterspeech would have advanced dialogue and how nonre-
sponsive retorts shut it down.  Speech and counterspeech can be complicated 
partners in the marketplace, and issues of politics, national security, or personal 
preference might understandably keep a president from squarely answering 
every challenge raised in a media report or candidly providing all of the facts 
in his possession.  But, in some instances, no response at all would be less 
damaging to the marketplace of ideas than the potentially deceptive nonrespon-
sive retort. 
More fundamentally, the disappearing norm of executive counterspeech 
harms the wider viability of the marketplace of ideas as an enduring American 
construct.  When the executive, who sets the tone for the nation and models the 
climate for the nation’s major collective conversations, sends the signal that 
factual, responsive contributions to the marketplace of ideas are no longer re-
quired, expected, or valued, it imposes a larger national loss.  Lowering these 
expectations in our public discourse makes it less likely that others will use 
 
 153. See Blasi, supra note 17, at 529 (“The tendency of officials to abuse their pub-
lic trust is a theme that has permeated political thought from classical times to the pre-
sent.”). 
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competing empirical claims to engage substantively with their intellectual op-
ponents.  Other searches for truth will be less fruitful.  The patterns that we 
embrace as acceptable at the highest level of national discourse reflect our com-
mitment to truthseeking in the marketplace.  The post-truthism that seemingly 
emboldens President Trump to flout the norm of executive counterspeech be-
comes more entrenched as a substitute framework for national dialogue when 
his nonresponsive retorts go unchallenged or, worse yet, are accepted as the 
new normal. 
C. Press Consequences 
A third set of harms resulting from a president’s refusal to engage in coun-
terspeech centers on the press and its role in a democratic society.  Importantly, 
these harms do not rise and fall on the question of whether the press is perform-
ing its functions well or poorly—the absence of executive counterspeech works 
harms on the public in either event. 
The United States Supreme Court routinely assumes that the press is per-
forming valuable, democracy-enhancing work.154  If that is the case, President 
Trump’s decision to employ nonresponsive retorts can be dangerous to the con-
tinued legitimacy of an important institution.155  This is most obviously true 
when his chosen nonresponsive retort is a direct, ad hominem attack on a spe-
cific journalist or on the institutional press as a whole,156 but it is also true when 
he makes more a generic allegation that an issue or coverage area is “fake 
news.”  These labels construct the press as an enemy and impede it in its ability 
to communicate with the public and to do work on behalf of the public.  The 
watchdog and proxy functions of the press rely on a foundation of respect for 
the institution, even when there is serious disagreement about the particulars 
of its work.157  Nonresponsive retorts that attack rather than enlighten pose 
serious threats to that valuable informational structure.  If the president unfairly 
maligns the press with labels that suggest its reporting is inaccurate when that 
reporting is in fact just disfavored by the executive, there are grave conse-
quences to our ability to have meaningful national conversations, to be edu-
cated about public matters,158 and to be represented by the press as it attends 
public functions and asks questions of the government.159 
But even if we assume the converse—that the press is doing its job poorly 
and its coverage is inaccurate, biased, or otherwise flawed—the failure of the 
president to engage in meaningful counterspeech continues to work harm on 
 
 154. Jones, supra note 89, at 254. 
 155. See Jones & Sun, supra note 12, at 1347–67 (describing the risks of the presi-
dent undercutting the press). 
 156. See id. at 1346. 
 157. See id. at 1333–34 (describing the ways that President Nixon, despite serious 
tensions with the press, continued to convey that it was institutionally legitimate and 
constitutionally important). 
 158. See id. at 1361–63 (discussing the educational function of the press). 
 159. Id. at 1364. 
29
Jones: The Press and the Expectation of Executive Counterspeech
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
968 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
the nation and its people.  Indeed, the instances in which the press makes errors 
or otherwise falls short of the ideal of delivering comprehensive, truthful, and 
unbiased information are the instances when executive counterspeech—rather 
than bare nonresponsive retort—may be most important.  The checking func-
tion performed by speech on matters of public concern runs in two directions, 
and a president who fails to offer any counterspeech to press coverage that he 
perceives as inaccurate is failing to check the press.  The press might, of course, 
be countered by other speakers—and even by other press speakers—but to the 
extent the president is the individual possessing the crucial countering infor-
mation, his response that the report is “fake news” falls short of being counter-
speech.  Repetition of a “fake news” trope leaves the public nearly as unin-
formed as it was by the problematic reporting.  It does not adequately show 
where the error lies, provide any replacement information, or give the reading 
or viewing public any tools for selecting more accurate media sources. 
The “internally competitive system” of speech and counterspeech that the 
Founders “deliberately created”160 needs the “friction”161 of substantive, spe-
cific, factual pushback from the president.  Like the checks and balances that 
preserve the distribution of power among the branches of government, 162 the 
checks and balances between the executive and the press only meet the interests 
of the people if each party is actively guarding against the excesses of the other.  
Either party’s failure to engage in that “tug and pull”163 leaves the public at 
best underserved and at worst affirmatively misled and imperiled. 
Indeed, each additional use of nonresponsive retorts may further compro-
mise the president’s ability to check the press when it does commit reporting 
error.  If a retort like “fake news” is used with enough regularity and consist-
ently invoked in situations where there has not been actual falsehood, the read-
ing public will be unable to distinguish when the label is accurate in its descrip-
tive sense—that is, when it is being told that the news item has been fabricated 
and is factually false.  One journalist has already noted this concern in relation 
to a particularly lurid tale that President Trump has denounced as “fake 
news.”164  “[President]Trump has cried ‘fake news’ so frequently that his angry 
 
 160. Stewart, supra note 79, at 708. 
 161. Id. (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting)). 
 162. Id. at 707 (“[T]he Free Press guarantee is, in essence, a structural provision of 
the Constitution.”). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Ashley Parker, Real or ‘Fake News’? Either Way, Allegations of Lewd Tape 





Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss4/7
2018] EXECUTIVE COUNTERSPEECH 969 
denials have lost their wallop, part of a routine call-and-response with the me-
dia rather than evidence of legitimate inaccuracy.”165  Thus, despite its appar-
ent goal of disparaging and discrediting the press,166 a nonresponsive retort 
used in place of executive counterspeech may leave the press insufficiently 
critiqued by the president.  A president who attacks the press as biased or in-
competent, and who has the capacity to prove it by presenting superior or cor-
rective facts, would better advance his agenda by presenting those facts. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There is a widening disconnect between the presidential communications 
anticipated by the marketplace-of-ideas, self-governance, and checking-func-
tion theories and the actual responses offered by President Trump to press cov-
erage that he finds objectionable.  While these foundational principles call for 
responsive, factual, evidence-based counterspeech that aids the search for truth, 
advances public conversations, and enables accountability, the nonresponsive 
retorts employed by President Trump—including his iconic “fake news” man-
tra—serve none of those aims.  They at best offer bare contradiction and at 
worst constitute deliberate deception.  Democracy relies upon executive coun-
terspeech that contains factual evidence and supporting reasoning and that en-
gages in specific refutation rather than generalized critique or ad hominem at-
tack.  An executive’s refusal to engage in counterspeech on matters of public 
concern not only is inconsistent with fundamental principles of First Amend-
ment theory, but also is harmful in concrete ways to the goal of governmental 
accountability, to the society’s ongoing search for truth, to the wider tone of 











 165. Id. 
 166. Leslie Stahl: Trump Admitted Mission to Discredit the Press, supra note 141. 
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